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BEARING HOSPITAL TAX BREAKS: HOW NONPROFITS BENEFIT FROM YOUR SURPRISE
MEDICAL BILLS
Taylor N. Armstrong*
INTRODUCTION
Dan Harrison, a father from Atlanta, Georgia, is working to pay off
a medical bill he received after taking his seven-year-old daughter to
the emergency room.1 His daughter was having difficulty breathing
after coming down with pneumonia, and her pediatrician
recommended taking her to the emergency room.2 Harrison’s
daughter was covered by his health insurance, and she went to an
emergency room that was in-network, meaning one covered by his
insurance carrier.3 Dan paid the $250 copay, and his daughter
received the treatment she needed; however, that was not the end of
the financial obligation.4 Three months after the emergency-room
trip, Dan received a $1,400 bill for services that were not covered by
his insurance.5 Though the services were rendered at an in-network
hospital, unbeknownst to Dan, not all of the physicians who treated
his daughter were in-network with his provider.6 Even though Dan
did “everything that a reasonable person” would do, he was
responsible for paying the extra bill.7

* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Professor Erin Fuse
Brown for your help and feedback throughout the writing and editing process. To the Georgia State
University Law Review, thank you for all the hard work that went into this Note and the entire Law
Review. Finally and most importantly, thank you to my family and friends for your unwavering support
and encouragement throughout law school.
1.Associated Press, Georgia Lawmakers Work to End ‘Surprise Billing’ for Patients, AUGUSTA CHRON.
(Feb. 12, 2017, 12:46 AM), http://chronicle.augusta.com/2017-02-12/georgia-lawmakers-work-endsurprise-billing-patients [https://perma.cc/EUE5-CWD6].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Georgia Lawmakers Work to End ‘Surprise Billing’ for Patients, supra note 1.
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Families like the Harrisons carefully plan and budget to make ends
meet, but now, across the United States, families are opening their
mailboxes to unexpected medical bills.8 These bills can become
financially crippling debts that haunt patients and their families for
years to come and result in “lawsuit[s], a damaged credit score, a
home foreclosure, or worse.”9 Due to the trend of rising insurance
8. Brief for Tenn. Med. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, HCA Health Servs. of
Tennessee v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc., 2016 WL 3357180 (Tenn. 2016) (No. 10-89611), 2016 WL 6211577, at *17 (“The ‘surprise’ bill phenomenon is an issue nationwide . . . .”); see also
Haley Sweetland Edwards, How You Could Get Hit with a Surprise Medical Bill, TIME (Mar. 7, 2016),
http://time.com/4246845/health-care-insurance-suprise-medical-bill/
[https://perma.cc/TGU3-AB2U]
(describing a patient left with $106,000 in uncovered medical bills after treatment for a slip and fall);
Maggie Fox & Jane Derenowski, Surprise Medical Bills Found in 22 Percent of ER Visits, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 16, 2016, 5:00 PM, updated Nov. 16, 2016, 7:03 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/healthcare/surprise-medical-bills-found-22-percent-er-visits-n684956 [https://perma.cc/5C3E-HR42] (“A new
study published in the New England Journal of Medicine finds that, across the country, 22[%] of
people visiting in-network emergency rooms have to deal with bills from out-of-network doctors.”);
Elisabeth Ponsot & Daniel Moritz-Rabson, Americans Who Confronted ‘Surprise’ Medical Bills Share
Their
Stories,
PBS
NEWSHOUR
(June
26,
2016,
2:53
PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/americans-who-confronted-surprise-medical-bills-share-theirstories/ [https://perma.cc/H23K-6YCX] (sharing stories of patients left with uncovered medical bills
ranging from $5,000 to $40,000); Eric Salzman & Anna R. Schecter, Law Aims to Protect Medicare
Patients from Surprise Hospital Bill, NBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2017, 3:10 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/law-aims-protect-medicare-patients-surprise-hospital-billn730686 [https://perma.cc/K3A5-E9KA] (describing a patient left with $28,000 in uncovered medical
bills after treatment for a broken leg); Stephannie Stokes, Georgia Lawmakers Work to Curb Surprise
Medical Bills, WABE (Feb. 8, 2017), http://news.wabe.org/post/georgia-lawmakers-work-curb-surprisemedical-bills [https://perma.cc/D4GT-9QPM] (describing a patient left with $700 in uncovered costs
after an emergency room visit).
9. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 127,
130 (2017) (“The financial distress mounts after the service has been rendered, with the arrival of
involuntarily triggered, surprise out-of-network medical bills or added facility fees. The ordeal continues
as the patient tries to sort out the confusing pile of medical bills and insurance statements while unpaid
amounts are sold to debt collectors and reported to credit reporting agencies, where the medical bill can
become a lawsuit, a damaged credit score, a home foreclosure, or worse.”); see also Brief for Tenn.
Med. Ass’n, supra note 8, at *17 (“In 2011, the New York Department of Financial Services studied
more than 2,000 complaints involving surprise medical bills[] and found the average out-of-network
emergency bill was $7,006.”); Daryl M. Berke, Drive-by-Doctoring: Contractual Issues and Regulatory
Solutions to Increase Patient Protection from Surprise Medical Bills, 42 AM. J.L. & MED 170, 173
(2016) (“Medical bills from these situations can be crippling.”); Rebecca Lindstrom & Julie Wolfe,
Investigation: 41% of Georgians Report Surprise Medical Bills, 11ALIVE.COM (May 16, 2016, 8:30
PM),
http://www.11alive.com/news/local/investigation-41-of-georgians-report-surprise-medicalbills/190007567 [https://perma.cc/BL9J-LD42] (“‘Medical debt is the leading cause of bankruptcy,’ said
Stephens. ‘[It] can be devastating to a family. I mean thousands of dollars of unexpected medical costs
in a year can really have an impact to afford other necessary items.’”); Aimee Picchi, Most Americans
Can’t Handle a $500 Surprise Bill, CBS NEWS (Jan. 6, 2016, 5:14 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-cant-handle-a-500-surprise-bill/
[https://perma.cc/GR6J-XTMH] (“[Although] the recession may be long over, many Americans are still
living one bill away from financial disaster. . . . In fact, about 63[%] of Americans say they’re unable to
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costs throughout the 2000s and underwriting limitations created
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),
insurance companies have been seeking cost-saving strategies,
including narrowing insurance networks.10 While narrower networks
reduce insurance premiums, they also increase the likelihood that
patients will “find [themselves] out-of-network” and with a surprise
medical bill.11 Many states have passed laws to prohibit surprise bills,
but there are many patients beyond the reach of these protections,
including those in states without protective laws.12 To protect patients
from this gap, the federal Tax Code may provide a complementary
solution to minimal state and federal protections.
This Note addresses the growing issue of surprise medical bills
and how the United States Tax Code can be used to prevent many
patients from receiving these bills. Part I provides a background on
surprise billing and market factors that have led to an increase in the
bills as well as current legislative solutions to the problem.13 Part II
handle a $500 car repair or a $1,000 emergency room bill . . . .”).
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012); Fuse Brown,
supra note 9, at 133 (“The increasing out-of-pocket burden on patients is exacerbated by a related trend
of narrowing networks of providers participating in the patient’s health insurance plan. The ACA
prohibits health plans from using traditional insurance underwriting practices to reduce health care
spending through risk selection (e.g., avoiding bad risks and cherry-picking good risks). As such,
narrow networks have become the primary strategy for health insurers to keep health care premiums
from ballooning, by contracting with a limited network of providers who agree to lower fees in
exchange for a higher volume of patients.”); Rachel Dolan, From the Archives: Deductibles and Out-ofPocket
Costs,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150929.050860/full/ [https://perma.cc/TYT4-RJAJ]
(“Past surveys and analyses of health spending show that the growth in deductibles and out-of-pocket
spending is a trend across the system. Overall out-of-pocket spending has been on the rise for some
time, growing nearly 40[%] from 1996–2005. [Although] it has since slowed due to enactment of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) coverage provisions, National Health Expenditure projections call for
increased growth over the next decade.”); Elizabeth Johnson, The Never-Ending Debate over Health
Care
Narrow
Networks,
LAW360
(Mar.
12,
2014,
5:27
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/517282/the-never-ending-debate-over-health-care-narrow-networks
[https://perma.cc/6ENC-QQUS] (“Narrow networks are networks offered by health insurers that limit an
insured’s choice of health care providers, such as physicians and hospitals. Insurers often tout narrow
networks as a cost[-]saving measure.”).
11. Valerie Blake, Narrow Networks, the Very Sick, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act: Recalling the Purpose of Health Insurance and Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 63, 78 (2015)
(providing a rationale behind narrow networks and the different types of narrow networks that insurers
use); Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 133.
12. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 147.
13. See discussion infra Part I.
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analyzes the role that hospitals play in the insurance market, the
current standards for nonprofit hospitals to receive tax exemption
under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 501, and how these legal
standards fall short of accomplishing the goals of the tax
exemption.14 Finally, Part III proposes an alternative solution of
using the Tax Code as a means of protecting patients.15
I. What are Surprise Medical Bills?
“Surprise medical bills result from providers . . . that patients
reasonably assumed would be in-network, but actually are out-ofnetwork.”16 These bills are unexpected because families believe that
the expenses are already covered by their monthly premiums or are
limited to their plan’s high deductibles.17 Many Americans access
and pay for healthcare through health insurance because insurance
mitigates the cost of healthcare that individuals would otherwise be
unable to afford.18 Even if a patient has insurance, however, there is
no guaranteed protection from medical debt or increased costs
because most insurance plans do not cover every physician.19 While
the concept of out-of-network physicians is not new, surprise medical

14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. MARK A. HALL ET AL., SOLVING SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLS, SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE
INNOVATION HEALTH POL’Y 5 (2016) (defining providers as “physicians, hospitals, out-patient
facilities, laboratories, etc.”); see also Blake, supra note 11, at 87 (“The patient may not even realize he
or she is going out-of-network, for example, if the in-network hospital has out-of-network physicians
delivering care.”).
17. See Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 131 (“[I]nsurance coverage does not ensure financial protection
for patients . . . . The costs of health care are rising, and the patient is picking up a larger portion through
out-of-pocket cost-sharing. The financial protection afforded by insurance coverage, even the
historically robust coverage provided by employers, is eroding.”).
18. Julian J.Z. Polaris, Personal Networks: Health Coverage Status and the Invisible Burden on
Family and Friends, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 115, 125–26 (2016).
19. Id. at 126–27 (“[H]ealth coverage also provides some measure of protection against the financial
costs of medical treatment . . . . When services are needed, most plans do not offer 100% coverage.
Indeed, studies show that bankruptcy caused by medical debt often strikes those who had health
coverage at the time.”); Bob Herman, Billing Squeeze: Hospitals in Middle as Insurers and Doctors
Battle
Over
Out-of-Network
Charges,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug.
29,
2015),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150829/MAGAZINE/308299987 [https://perma.cc/29U6MEUA] (“‘[A] lot of patients don’t understand that if the hospital takes the insurance, [each] doctor that
comes to their bedside might not’ . . . .”).
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bills arise even when the patient tries assiduously to remain innetwork but is unable to avoid out-of-network physicians.20
Many hospitals use physician outsourcing firms to staff various
departments in the hospital, including the emergency room.21
Although these physicians work in the hospital, they may not
contract with the same insurance providers as the hospital facility.22
Hospitals outsource various departments, mainly emergency rooms,
due to rising costs and staffing shortages.23 The increased use of
staffing agencies is correlated with a significant increase in surprise
medical billing.24 This increased risk arises from the contracting
abilities of staffing agencies compared to physicians employed by the
hospital who can require their physicians to contract with the same
insurance plans or enter into contracts on the physician’s behalf.25
Although surprise medical bills are most often a product of
emergency scenarios, as with Dan and his daughter, these bills can
also occur during nonemergency situations.26 A surprise medical bill
stems from a nonemergency situation when a patient goes to the
hospital for a scheduled procedure, one that the patient knows is
covered by the patient’s insurance, and while receiving care is treated
by an out-of-network physician or staff or with an instrument or
20. Herman, supra note 19.
21. Id.; Samantha Liss, When a Nonprofit Health System Outsources Its ER, Debt Collectors Follow,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 17, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/when-a-nonprofithealth-system-outsources-its-er-debt-collectors/article_826b26bf-0c85-5ae4-9af1-a1f9f9591539.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3QH-ZJPU] (“[Outsourcing emergency services is] a common practice in the
industry, but some legal experts say the nonprofit hospitals are exposing their most vulnerable patients,
who are poor or uninsured, to potentially aggressive collection practices even when those patients would
otherwise be eligible for discounts or charity care.”).
22. Herman, supra note 19.
23. See Zack Cooper et al., Surprise! Out-of-Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United
States 7 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Inst. Research, Working Paper No. 23623, 2017).
24. Id. at 36.
25. Id.
26. Brief for Tenn. Med. Ass’n, supra note 8, at *17 (“One national survey found that 8% of
privately insured individuals used out-of-network care in 2011; 40% of those claims involved surprise
(involuntary) out[-]of[-]network claims. This survey found that most surprise medical bills were related
to emergency care.”); Hall, supra note 16, at 5; Herman, supra note 19 (“The second scenario [where
surprise billing occurs] is when out-of-network physicians provide surgical or other scheduled care at innetwork facilities. Patients may do their homework to see whether their providers are in their plan
network. But ‘a lot of patients don’t understand that if the hospital takes the insurance, [each] doctor that
comes to their bedside might not . . . .’”).
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medical device that is not covered by the patient’s insurance.27 Both
emergency and nonemergency surprise medical bills result in the
insured patient being charged a substantially higher out-of-network
bill because there is no contract between the insurer and the
physician for an agreed-upon rate.28 Non-contracted providers (i.e.,
out-of-network providers) will typically charge the patient the
difference between the provider’s full charges and the amount
covered by the insurer, a practice called balance-billing, and the
insurer will also require a higher level of patient cost sharing. The
difficulty, particularly in emergency situations, is that the patient is
both unaware that she is receiving out-of-network treatment and that
these services include additional costs.29
A recent Yale study that analyzed insurance data “to study the
drivers of out-of-network billing for emergency care” brought the
issue of surprise billing to light.30 The study found that staffing
companies are building business models to capitalize on the policy
gap that created the surprise billing issue.31 One staffing company,
27. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 137.
28. Brief for Tenn. Med. Ass’n, supra note 8, at *16 (“When payment disputes occur between
providers and insurers, the patient is caught in the middle.”); Cooper, supra note 23, at 36 (“The
fundamental problem in this setting is that there is a missing contract between the physician and the
insurer.”).
29. Brief for Tenn. Med. Ass’n, supra note 8, at *16 (“Patients may choose to go to facilities in their
health insurers’ networks, understandably assuming that because the facilities are in their network, all
providers who will treat them will also be in their network, and their insurance will pay for most of the
allowed charges at an agreed reimbursement rate. However, that is not always the case. Even when
patients seek treatment at in-network hospitals, they may be treated by out-of-network physicians who
work at the facility. When this happens, patients may receive out-of-network bills from physicians they
are often considered ‘surprise’ bills.”).
30. Cooper, supra note 23, at 2.
31. Id. at 36.
We find that when both firms enter hospitals, there is a large increase in out-ofnetwork billing. Following the entry of EmCare, we observe that hospitals’ out-ofnetwork billing rates increased by between [eighty-one] and [ninety] percentage
points. Likewise, after TeamHealth entered hospitals, out-of-network billing rates in
our data increased by [thirty-three] percentage points. Consistent with our model, we
find evidence of a transfer to hospitals following the entry of these firms. In addition
to increasing out-of-network billing, we find that when EmCare enters a hospital, it
increases the amount facilities get paid via increases in imaging rates and the rates that
patients are admitted from the ED to the hospital. We also find that after EmCare
enters a hospital, patients are 43% more likely to have physician services coded using
the most high intensity, high paying codes. We find that TeamHealth pursues a
different strategy. When TeamHealth enters a hospital, it raises out-of-network rates
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TeamHealth, increased out-of-network bills by 33% after staffing the
hospital with out-of-network physicians.32 Another physician staffing
company, EmCare, a subsidiary of Envision Healthcare, increased
out-of-network billing rates by approximately 81%–90% upon
entering the emergency department of hospitals across the United
States.33 Although the patients visiting these emergency departments
may have visited a hospital that was in their network, the outsourced
emergency room physicians, staffed by EmCare were out-of-network
physicians who are costlier due to higher cost-sharing and balancebilling.34 Further, these physicians bill their patients at the highest
level of care, meaning that the physicians charge patients the highest
rates possible for the rendered service.35
As a result of this study, EmCare’s shareholders filed a class action
lawsuit alleging that the company violated securities laws when it
included materially false information in its filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.36 The allegedly materially false
information claimed that EmCare was “well-positioned to continue to
generate significant organic growth . . . .”37 The shareholders
challenged that statement, claiming that EmCare’s “revenues were
likely to be unsustainable after the [deliberate out-of-network billing
significantly (although out-of-network billing rates at these hospitals drop over time
after entry) and also raises hospital activity rates.
Id.; see also Herman, supra note 19 (noting that TeamHealth and EmCare are two of the largest
physician outsourcing firms in the U.S.).
32. Cooper, supra note 23, at 36.
33. Id.
34. Id.; Julie Creswell, Reed Abelson & Margot Sanger-Katz, The Company Behind Many Surprise
Emergency Room Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/upshot/thecompany-behind-many-surprise-emergency-room-bills.html [https://perma.cc/FAV6-KMAD]; Bob
Herman, Envision Faces Lawsuit for Allegedly Hiding Billing Practices, AXIOS (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.axios.com/envision-faces-lawsuit-for-allegedly-hiding-billing-practices-2471470725.html
[https://perma.cc/BUN4-CPK2].
35. Cooper, supra note 23, at 36; Creswell, Abelson & Sanger-Katz, supra note 34; Herman, supra
note 34; What is Medical Billing, AM. ACAD. PROF’L CODERS, https://www.aapc.com/medicalbilling/medical-billing.aspx [https://perma.cc/3EUT-FEK6] (last visited Jan. 14, 2019); see FeeSchedule
General
Information,
CTRS.
MEDICAID
&
MEDICARE
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/FeeScheduleGenInfo/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DPM2-W4AX] (last modified Nov. 14, 2018, 3:56 PM) (providing fee basis for
“physicians, ambulance services, clinical laboratory services, and durable medical equipment,
prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies”).
36. Complaint at 5, Bettis v. Envision Healthcare (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2017) (No. 3:17cv112).
37. Id. at 9.
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practices] came to light” due to the moral considerations involved in
the billing practices.38 The reason that shareholders sued the
corporation for presenting materially false information and not for
EmCare’s surprise billing practices was that these practices are
currently unrestricted in many states.39 There have been minimal
federal efforts to prevent or resolve these bills, and only a few states
have taken steps to protect patients from being liable for these bills
and to close the gap between insurance coverage and necessary
treatment for patients.40
A. Cost Increases Lead to Narrower Networks
Healthcare policy is particularly complicated due to the number of
interests involved: patients, hospitals, health plans, physicians, and
states are all heavily involved in the system, and each plays an
important role.41 Patients want to receive affordable treatment and
minimize their risk of receiving crushing bills.42 Physicians and
hospitals want to be paid for their services.43 Health plans stand in
38. Id. at 2–3 (“Specifically, [d]efendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) EmCare routinely arranged for patients who sought treatment at in-network facilities to
be treated by out-of-network physicians; (ii) EmCare accordingly billed these patients at higher rates
than if the patients had received treatment from in-network physicians; (iii) the Company’s statements
attributing EmCare’s Class Period growth to other factors were therefore false and/or misleading; (iv)
Envision’s EmCare revenues were likely to be unsustainable after the foregoing conduct came to light;
and (v) as a result of the foregoing, Envision’s public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.”).
39. Id.
40. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 134 (“It is the states . . . that have led the way with an array of legal
innovations to address consumer protections in health care—particularly in the area of surprise medical
bills but also in limits to medical debt[-]collection practices.”); Alyssa Rege, 7 States Addressing
Surprise Medical Billing so Far in 2017, BECKER’S HOSP. CFO REPORT (Mar. 13, 2017),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/7-states-addressing-surprise-medical-billing-so-far-in2017.html [https://perma.cc/BST4-EX65].
41. Polaris, supra note 18, at 125.
The story of American health coverage institutions reveals an attempt to balance the
interests of four main groups: (1) individual people, who depend on health coverage to
pay for medical care; (2) parties to the individual’s health-related transactions,
including healthcare providers, who need to be paid, and private health plans, who
often do the paying; (3) employers, who determine the available health plan options
for many Americans; and (4) the [s]tate, which mediates among these often-conflicting
interests while also accounting for broader public policy goals.
Id.
42. Id. at 132.
43. See Brian Secemsky, Health Care 101: How Doctors Are Paid, HUFFINGTON POST,
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between physicians and patients and attempt to mitigate the risk of
patients receiving these bills while ensuring that physicians and
hospitals are paid.44 Finally, states have a policy interest in ensuring
“population health and financial security.”45
Insurance providers pass on their cost increases—from
administrative costs and market factors—to the patient through
higher deductibles and copays, further straining the protection that
health insurance provides.46 Physicians and hospitals contract with
insurance companies for business at the expense of lower rates on
products and services with the goal of making up the cost in
additional patient volume.47 A physician or hospital that has a
contract with the insurance company is considered to be
in-network.48 However, as insurance companies face increasing costs
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-secemsky/health-news_b_5400348.html [https://perma.cc/76FZB7UY] (updated Jul. 30, 2014).
44. Polaris, supra note 18, at 132.
45. Id. at 132–33 (“The [s]tate seeks to preserve a well-functioning healthcare industry that serves
the individual interests of health and financial security while maintaining the solvency of critical
health[]care institutions. Moreover, the [s]tate itself operates public health[]care plans and hospitals. It
thus has an interest in preventing health[]care costs from consuming an increasingly large share of both
public and private budgets.”).
46. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 131 (“There is a great cost shift underway in American health care.
The costs of health care are rising, and the patient is picking up a larger portion through out-of-pocket
cost[]sharing. The financial protection afforded by insurance coverage, even the historically robust
coverage provided by employers, is eroding.”); see John Aloysius Cogan, Jr., Health Insurance Rate
Review, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 411, 420–21 (2016):
Health insurance rates in the United States have been increasing dramatically . . . . To
make matters worse, the cost-sharing component of most health insurance plans—the
deductibles, copays, and coinsurance—have increased as well. This means total cost
increases borne by American families for their health coverage are even greater than
reflected by premium increases alone.
What factors drive these increases? Most discussions of healthcare cost drivers, as if
responding to Captain Louis Renault’s famous line in the film Casablanca, typically
“round up the usual suspects.” The list of cost drivers usually includes some or all of a
wide-ranging list of potential culprits, including “[f]ee-for-service reimbursement,”
“[f]ragmented delivery of care,” “[a]dministrative burdens on providers,”
population health factors, “advances in medical technology,” the tax treatment
of health insurance, “insurance benefit design,” a “[l]ack of cost and quality
transparency,” medical care market consolidation, the high prices of medical goods
and services, medical malpractice premiums, fraud and abuse, and the structure and
supply of the medical care workforce.
Id.
47. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 131.
48. Deborah Farringer, Everything Old is New Again: Will Narrow Networks Succeed Where HMOs
Failed?, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 299, 317 (2016).
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and restraints, “including prohibitions on denying individuals with
pre-existing conditions and limitations on the rating of patients,” they
have resorted to limiting networks to provide more cost-effective
solutions.49 Although narrower networks may reduce insurance
premiums up front, these plans are much riskier and open the door
for increases in surprise billing by increasing the pool of out-ofnetwork physicians and services.50 These gaps in coverage, which
patients are unaware of, are precisely what the staffing companies
have used to their advantage.51
B. Current Legislative Solutions
The federal government has taken steps to address narrow
networks and denials of coverage, such as setting network adequacy
standards and preventing health plans from treating emergency care
as out-of-network, but has not done much to address surprise billing
from the physician providing the emergency care.52 Most of the
policy changes have come from the states.53 Although states are
49. Id. at 302–03 (“As health insurers try to navigate the new limitations set forth under the ACA,
including prohibitions on denying individuals with pre-existing conditions and limitations on the rating
of patients, insurers are looking toward[] models that will enable them to control costs without access to
their usual tools. What they have developed is not so much a new insurance model[] but actually a
concept that first arose during the rise of managed care; that is, limited provider networks utilized within
health maintenance organizations (‘HMOs’). These ‘new’ insurance products, often referred to as
narrow networks or high-performance networks, offer beneficiaries a more limited network of
physicians typically in exchange for lower premiums. These insurance plans are becoming increasingly
common both on the federal and state health insurance exchanges as well as in insurance product
offerings outside the exchanges.”); Johnson, supra note 10 (“The theory is that if insurers can guarantee
some providers a higher volume of patients based on a limited network of providers, those providers
will be willing to accept a lower reimbursement for services, thus controlling costs.”).
50. HALL, supra note 16, at 12 (“[U]nder existing market forces, provider networks
are becoming narrower, creating more situations where patients encounter a mix of network and
non-network providers.”).
51. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 35.
52. Farringer, supra note 48, at 317–22; HALL, supra note 16, at 17. Network adequacy standards
require insurers to provide patients with an adequate selection of physicians and hospitals over a range
of specialties. Farringer, supra note 48, at 314.
53. Brief for Tenn. Med. Ass’n, supra note 8, at *10 (“Federal law does not provide a clear-cut
standard for payment of out-of-network emergency services.”); Berke, supra note 9, at 173
(“Interestingly, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides only minimal protection
for patients in these situations.”); Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 154–55 (“The Federal government, by
contrast, appears to be taking a more incremental approach. In 2016, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a very limited measure to address surprise medical bills . . . . [T]his
provides very limited protection against surprise medical bills . . . .”).
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leading the way in patient protection from these bills, states are
limited in the regulations that they can pass due to the preemptive
effects of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).54
New York, Connecticut, California, Florida, and Texas are some of
the states that have passed medical-billing legislation in an attempt to
protect patients from being stuck with a surprise bill, and there are
several other states proposing and debating new legislation.55
The debate over surprise-billing legislation focuses on which party
carries the burden of negotiating the treatment fee. Some states, such
as New York, hold the patient harmless and prohibit the patient from
being charged more than he would be charged if the physician was
in-network.56 This approach requires that the dispute be resolved
between the insurer and the out-of-network provider, many times
with the hospital acting as the mediator between the parties.57
C. The Hospital’s Role
Hospitals contract with both physicians and insurance
companies.58 The hospital provides physicians a facility and staff to
work with and provides insurance companies discounted hospital
services to the insureds by contracting for these discounts.59 Patients
run the risk of incurring additional costs when the hospital contracts
with a physician who has not separately contracted with the insurance
company.60 Thus, even when the patient shows up to an in-network
hospital for treatment, not every service provided by physicians in
the hospital may be in-network.
54. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 134–35.
55. Id. at 147–49 (“A number of states have begun to pass legislation targeting surprise bills and
balance[]billing directly . . . . More recently, states have begun passing legislation to more specifically
address the phenomenon of surprise medical bills . . . . Thus far, New York, Connecticut, California,
Florida, and Texas have passed laws curtailing surprise medical billing.”); Rege, supra note 40
(“Legislators from seven states have proposed legislation in the first few months of 2017 to mitigate the
practice of surprise medical billing.”). These states include Rhode Island, Georgia, Ohio, Arizona,
Oregon, Utah, and Texas. Rege, supra note 40.
56. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 149.
57. Id.; Herman, supra note 19.
58. Berke, supra note 9, at 174.
59. Id.
60. Brief for Tenn. Med. Ass’n, supra note 8, at *7.
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Due to the societal benefits that hospitals provide, the United
States Tax Code allows tax exemptions for hospitals that qualify as
charitable organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).61 Under this
provision, hospitals may qualify as charitable, nonprofit
organizations and are exempt from federal tax.62 Further, many
states, including Georgia, allow a property-tax exemption for
charitable, nonprofit organizations.63 The estimated savings to
hospitals from federal tax exemptions are approximately $12 billion
annually, and the estimated savings from state property tax are
almost $2 million annually.64 The public benefit to the community
from hospitals’ services drives the policy behind allowing hospitals
to receive this tax exemption.65 The following section analyzes the
requirements that hospitals must satisfy to remain tax exempt and
how the tax-exemption requirements can be used to protect patients
from receiving a surprise medical bill.
II. The Hospital as an Intermediary
The hospital is the place where the participants in the market meet:
physicians have a facility to provide healthcare to those in need, and
patients have a location to receive those services.66 The hospital
61. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019).
62. Id. § 501(c).
63. Bobby Courtney, Hospital Tax-Exemption and the Community Benefit Standard: Considerations
for Future Policymaking, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 365, 371 (2010) (“[Although] most states have
historically recognized nonprofit community hospitals as being exempt from property taxes, a series of
cases and legislation beginning in 1985 illustrate a growing concern that nonprofit hospitals are not
providing charity care sufficient to meet exemption.”); Basics of Property Tax Exemption for Nonprofits
in Georgia, PRO BONO P’SHIP ATLANTA 1 (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.pbpatl.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Basics-of-Property-Tax-Exemption-for-Nonprofits-in-Georgia2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YDU8-K3SS].
64. Susannah Camic Tahk, Tax-Exempt Hospitals and Their Communities, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. 33,
35 (2014); Gary J. Young, Federal Tax-Exemption Requirements for Joint Ventures Between Nonprofit
Hospital Providers and For-Profit Entities: Form over Substance?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 327, 329
(2004).
65. St. Luke’s Hosp. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 85, 89 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (“Statutory provisions
which grant tax exemptions to organizations designed to benefit the public good through charitable,
religious, scientific, or educational purposes are construed liberally against taxation. This rule of
construction is based upon the policy that the benefit derived from the revenue is outweighed by the
benefit derived by the public from the services of these organizations.”).
66. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 465–66 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2015) (quoting
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serves an invaluable function by providing a centralized location for
health care access rather than dispersing treatment across multiple
facilities.67 However, hospitals often find themselves in the middle of
billing disputes between patients, staff physicians, and the patients’
insurers.68 Hospitals are placed in the position of mediating between
the insurer or insured and the physician to settle billing disputes.69
Any portion of the bill that the insurer does not cover will be paid by
either the patient or the hospital.70 Further, hospitals often struggle to
get the physicians to the table to meet and negotiate a resolution to
these disputes. 71 The irony is that hospitals were the ones who
brought the physicians to the hospitals in the first place.72
Many physicians do not actually work for the hospital but are
independent contractors who have separate contracts with the
hospital; therefore, they are not bound to be in-network with the
insurance companies that the hospital contracts with and,
significantly, have separate contracts with health plans.73 This trend
of hospitals outsourcing various departments, including emergency
rooms, and using staffing companies is not likely to diminish because
Belmar v. Cipolla, 475 A.2d 533, 537–38 (N.J. 1984)) (“‘[A] hospital is a complex business vitally
affected with a public interest’ . . . . ’[A] hospital is a work place for hundreds of people who care for
patients, maintain and operate the plant and equipment, and conduct the business of a complicated
health care facility.’”).
67. Id.
68. Herman, supra note 19 (“[H]ospitals increasingly find themselves caught in the middle as
patients, insurers[,] and physicians fight over who should pick up bills for services that patients
unknowingly receive from out-of-network doctors.”).
69. Id. (“The most stressful part for hospital officials, who often serve as mediators between
insurers and out-of-network physicians, is getting physicians to come to the table.”). See generally Drew
Calvert, Who Bears the Cost of the Uninsured? Nonprofit Hospitals., KELLOGGINSIGHT (June 22, 2015),
https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/who-bears-the-cost-of-the-uninsured-nonprofit-hospitals
[https://perma.cc/J97F-7XHD].
70. Herman, supra note 19; Calvert, supra note 69 (“That means hospitals are effectively serving as
‘insurers of last resort’ within the American health[]care sector by providing care to uninsured patients
who cannot afford to pay their medical bills. ‘People are still going to the emergency room . . . and they
are still receiving treatment—so the cost is still there. When governments do not provide health
insurance, hospitals must effectively provide it instead.’”).
71. Herman, supra note 19 (“The most stressful part for hospital officials, who often serve as
mediators between insurers and out-of-network physicians, is getting physicians to come to the
table . . . . A growing number of hospitals and insurers are setting up processes to resolve
out-of-network bills before the problem escalates into a public relations disaster that could undermine
support for narrow-network plans.”).
72. Id.
73. Liss, supra note 21.
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hospitals are dealing with increasing costs and challenges in staffing
emergency rooms.74 Although using staffing agencies may alleviate
costs, outsourcing puts patients at a greater risk of receiving a
surprise medical bill.75
While patients are becoming more susceptible to receiving
crushing bills, hospitals are still enjoying their tax-exempt status.76
Hospitals are not exempt from taxation solely due to their status as
hospitals; the hospital must qualify for this tax exemption under IRC
§ 501(c)(3).77 Previously, to qualify as tax exempt, a hospital simply
had to meet the community-benefit standard to demonstrate that it
was serving charitable purposes under 501(c)(3).78 The definition of
what constituted community benefit for this requirement is not
formalized in the Tax Code but was articulated in a series of IRS
Revenue Rulings.79 However, after the passage of the ACA, hospitals
must also satisfy additional operational requirements under §
501(r).80 These requirements were added to protect uninsured
74. Herman, supra note 19; Liss, supra note 21 (“Concerned about the rising cost and complexities
needed to staff emergency rooms, SSM made the decision in 2008 to contract out most of its
ERs . . . .”).
75. Herman, supra note 19.
76. See Mary Crossley, Health and Taxes: Hospitals, Community Health and the IRS, 16 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 51, 54 (2016) (“The annual value of federal tax exemption for hospitals
was estimated at over six billion dollars more than a decade ago, and a recent estimate placed the value
of the federal exemption at thirteen billion dollars.”).
77. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Courtney, supra note 63, at 368 (“Hospitals are not per se tax
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code, rather receipt of such benefits is grounded in an organization’s
designation as ‘charitable’ under § 501(c)(3).”).
78. I.R.C. § 501(c), (r) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D.
Tex. 2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Erin C. Fuse Brown, Fair Hospital Prices Are Not
Charity: Decoupling Hospital Pricing and Collection Rules from Tax Status, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
509, 522 (2016) (“The ACA created a series of new requirements for nonprofit hospitals to maintain
their tax-exempt status for all tax years after March 23, 2010.”). These new requirements were added
after “years of litigation, congressional hearings, and media attention on the dichotomy between the
ostensibly charitable purposes of tax-exempt hospitals” to protect patients from excessive bills and
collection practices by nonprofit hospitals. Fuse Brown, supra, at 511.
79. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1
C.B. 202; see James McGrath, Overcharging the Uninsured in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater Share of
Uncompensated Medical Care Costs to the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 173, 203
(2007).
80. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (exempting “[c]orporations, and any . . . foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder . . .”),
invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan.
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individuals who generally receive the highest bills and then face the
repercussions of that debt.81 If the hospital fails to meet the
requirements set out in § 501(c)(3) and § 501(r), the hospital will
forfeit its tax-exempt status; however, there is no private right of
action for a patient to sue to enforce compliance.82
A. Requirements for Tax Exemption
Hospitals must satisfy requirements under § 501(c) as well as IRC
§ 501(r)(1) to qualify for federal tax exemption.83 Under § 501(c), the
hospital must satisfy charitable requirements discussed below.
Additionally, § 501(r) requires hospitals to perform a communityhealth-needs assessment every three years, establish a financial-needs
assistance policy, limit charges to those who qualify for financial
assistance to charges that are generally billed for the treatment, and
adhere to certain billing and collection requirements.84
1. Charitable Requirements
Charitability is the first criterion that a hospital must satisfy to
qualify as tax exempt; however, the term “charitable” is not defined
7, 2019); Courtney, supra note 63, at 368 (“Generally speaking, qualification for exemption under this
section requires that a hospital: 1) be organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes; 2) not
use any part of its net earnings for the benefit of any private person; and 3) adhere to certain statutory
limitations regarding legislative lobbying and participation in political campaigns.”); Fuse Brown, supra
note 78, at 514; Rachel Weisblatt, Uncharitable Hospitals: Why the IRS Needs Intermediate Sanctions
to Regulate Tax-Exempt Hospitals, 55 B.C. L. REV. 687, 694 (2014).
81. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 510–11 (noting the § 501(r) requirements “were designed in part
to address the problem of the uninsured being charged the highest amounts for hospital care and then
being hounded by aggressive debt[]collection efforts, often to the point of financial ruin”).
82. See generally Feliciano v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., No. 04-CV-04177, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21565 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2005) (lawsuit by uninsured and indigent patient against nonprofit
hospital and hospital system was dismissed because: (1) hospitals’ tax-exempt status under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) did not create contract with patient as third-party beneficiary requiring hospitals to provide
affordable medical care to all patients; (2) even if it did, only relief obtainable was right to assess and
collect federal taxes if hospitals failed to comply with terms of tax exemption; and (3) there was no
private right of action under § 501(c)(3)); Lisa Kinney Helvin, Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-forProfit Hospitals Doing Their Share?, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 421, 427 (2008) (“As the
recent lawsuits demonstrate, § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code simply does not supply federal
courts with the tools to hold not-for-profit hospitals accountable for caring for uninsured patients when
the complaining parties are third-party patients.”).
83. I.R.C. § 501(r).
84. Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2019

15

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7

824

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

in IRC § 501(c).85 The regulations surrounding § 501(c) state that
not-for-profit hospitals gain their tax-exempt status by serving a
public interest rather than a private interest.86 The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) issued a series of Revenue Rulings to further explain
what is meant by charitable and “serves a public rather than a private
interest” by establishing a set of standards to satisfy these
requirements.87 The IRS determines the charitable status on a caseby-case basis.88 Revenue Ruling 56-185 spells out general
requirements that would establish a hospital as tax exempt.89 These
requirements look to whether the hospital is (1) organized as a
nonprofit, (2) open to those who are both able and unable to afford
treatment, (3) not operated exclusively with one group of physicians,
and (4) not directing profits to a private individual or shareholder.90
Revenue Ruling 69-545 broadened the requirements of Revenue
Ruling 56-185 and held that the IRS would “weigh all of the relevant
facts and circumstances” when determining whether a hospital has
satisfied the charitable requirement and added factors—including
operating an emergency room that is open to all as well as reinvesting
profits to improve patient care.91 However, the ruling also clarified
that the presence or absence of one factor does not mean that the
hospital is no longer tax exempt per se.92 This sets a very broad, ad
hoc standard for hospitals to be considered charitable. Even a
hospital that does not operate an emergency room or admits only
those who can pay for their treatment would still qualify for tax
exemption.93 This is because the presence of an emergency
85. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 29 (1976).
86. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2018).
87. Id.; Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 56-185,
1956-1 C.B. 202.
88. McGrath, supra note 79, at 203.
89. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
90. Id.; Helvin, supra note 82, at 440–41 (“[T]he IRS set forth four ‘general requirements’ that a
health care organization was obligated to meet in order to be deemed ‘charitable’ for federal tax[]exemption purposes . . . . [T]he most notable of these requirements was that a hospital must serve those
who are unable to pay for health services[] and not exclusively care for patients who can afford the
costs.”).
91. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 692–93.
92. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 692–93.
93. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Helvin, supra note 82, at 442.
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department is merely one of several weighted factors used to
determine whether a community benefit is being provided rather than
being required to qualify for tax exemption.94 Accordingly, the
outsourcing of an emergency room using a staffing company, whose
strategy is to bill patients at out-of-network rates and use harsh
collection practices, would not prohibit tax exemption of the hospital
facility.
The charitable requirement looks in part at the amount of free or
charity care that the hospital provides as reported on its annual
informational return to the IRS.95 In addition to not charging patients
for products and services, nonprofit hospitals may take unpaid and
uncollectible bills and mark them as charity care.96 The higher the
bills are from the outset, the more likely it is that patients default on
payments. 97 When patients default on payments, the hospital can
denote the cost of the unpaid services as charity care and use that cost
toward its charitable requirement.98 As a result, bad debt expenses or
the costs of uncollectible services becomes more than just a
deduction—they allow the nonprofit entity to avoid paying any
federal tax or state property taxes.99 Because the hospital is able to
categorize the bad debt as charity, the federal government is, in
effect, the insurer of those who are unable to pay their medical
94. Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 693–94 (“[T]he IRS defines the community benefits standard as
broadly as possible in recognition of the diverse needs of each tax-exempt hospital’s surrounding
community. For example, a hospital that does not operate an emergency room can still qualify for a tax
exemption if a state agency determines that an additional emergency room would duplicate services
already being provided elsewhere in the community. This is particularly important for many
specialty hospitals that lack emergency rooms (e.g., surgical facilities) or other hospitals that typically
treat very few Medicare patients (e.g., children’s hospitals). Thus, given the broad interpretation of the
community benefits standard, a hospital can obtain tax-exempt status as a charitable organization even if
it does not provide any charitable care.”).
95. McGrath, supra note 79, at 175–76.
96. Id. (“Rather than write off unpaid, uncollectible bills, not-for-profit entities report them as
‘charity care.’ The ability to maintain their charitable status by overstating their provision of free care is
part of the calculus that allows these hospitals to be classified as not-for-profit; it may also net these
hospitals great savings from property tax burdens.”).
97. Id. at 176.
98. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11, 37 (2014).
Historically, hospitals reported the billed amount as bad debt rather than the cost of the unpaid services
provided. Id. Now, hospitals must report the cost of the unpaid services as the bad debt expense to
prevent hospitals from driving up the billed cost to increase their bad debt expense. Id.
99. I.R.C. § 166 (2018) (allowing a deduction for whole or partially worthless debts).
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bills.100 These bills are only written off once the hospital has tried to
collect on the bill or predetermined that the patient would be unable
to pay.101
In an effort to both focus on preventative medicine and put
hospitals in a stronger position to serve the community’s needs, the
IRS now requires a Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA)
to be performed every three years.102 Through this assessment and
the consideration of the needs of the community, the IRS looks not
only at charity care but also at community health involvement.103
This assessment includes gathering health data on the community and
adopting strategies to address the issues facing the particular area
where the hospital is located.104 The CHNA includes data on
financial access to care as well as nutrition and “social, behavioral,
and environmental factors,” all of which play a role in public
health.105
When conducting the CHNA, hospitals have the discretion—after
considering all facts and circumstances—to prioritize the “health
needs of their communities” over profits to earn tax-exempt status.106
Because the guidelines do not set criteria for what is a significant
health need, the hospital may prioritize a need that is minor as
opposed to a major community need.107 In addition to considering
“factors like the availability or absence of healthful foods,
transportation options, living wages, and safe neighborhoods,”
100. McGrath, supra note 79, at 176 (“The federal government, in other words, has become the
unwitting insurer for many who do not actually have either private or government health insurance[] and
are unable to pay for health care out-of-pocket.”).
101. Id.
102. I.R.C. § 501(r) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Crossley, supra note 76, at 56; Weisblatt, supra note 80, at
692.
103. Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social Determinants of Health: A Central Role for Providers, 33
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 244 (2017); Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 694–95.
104. Crossley, supra note 76, at 56; Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 695.
105. Mantel, supra note 103, at 245; Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 694–95.
106. Crossley, supra note 76, at 56; Jillian A. Swogier, Finding a Fit for Nonprofit Hospitals: A
National Perspective of State Property Tax Exemption Laws, 41 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 461, 465 (2017).
107. Crossley, supra note 76, at 69; Mary Crossley, Health Reform and the Mission of Nonprofit
Hospitals, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Apr. 28, 2014), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2014/04/28/healthreform-and-the-mission-of-nonprofit-hospitals/ [https://perma.cc/4E3T-K2A3] [hereinafter Health
Reform].
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financial access to healthcare is also relevant.108 From this
standpoint, as surprise medical bills become a bigger issue, an
emergency room that serves the needs of the community without
burdening it with medical bills should be included in the CHNA,
along with a plan as to how the hospital intends to address this
need.109 When conducting the CHNA, the value of the medical debt
in the community that arose from treatment at the hospital should be
considered in the data on the financial access to care. For example, in
St. Louis, Missouri, over one thousand lawsuits have been filed to
collect on medical debt, and 99% of these lawsuits involve debt that
arose from treatment at a nonprofit hospital’s emergency room.110
When the hospital is performing its CHNA, these debt-collection
cases should be considered, and the hospital should implement a plan
to address the community need and financial access to healthcare.
These strategies could include reviewing the hospital’s hiring and
contracting practices. Through completing this assessment and
addressing the need of the community, the hospital would be
fulfilling the purpose of the CHNA.
2. Financial Assistance Policy and Requirements on Charges
IRC § 501(r)(4) requires every tax-exempt hospital to write and
publish two financial assistance policies (FAPs)—one general policy
and one emergency-services policy.111 Included in the FAP are the
eligibility criteria, information on how charges are calculated, the
108. Crossley, supra note 76, at 69; Mantel, supra note 103, at 245.
109. See Fox & Derenowski, supra note 8.
110. Liss, supra note 21. Additionally, in St. Joseph, Missouri, the only hospital in the small town is
responsible for a majority of the 11,000 debt-collection suits that were filed from 2009 to 2013. Paul
Kiel, From the E.R. to the Courtroom: How Nonprofit Hospitals Are Seizing Patients’ Wages,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofit-hospitalsare-seizing-patients-wages [https://perma.cc/KB67-NLBA].
111. I.R.C. § 501(r)(4) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals;
Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals; Requirement of a Section 4959 Excise
Tax Return and Time for Filing the Return, 79 Fed. Reg. 78,954, 78,972 (Dec. 31, 2014) (“FAP must
apply to all emergency and other medically necessary care provided in a hospital facility by a
partnership owned in part by, or a disregarded entity wholly owned by, the hospital organization
operating the hospital facility, to the extent such care is not an unrelated trade or business with respect to
the hospital organization.”); Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 523; Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 695.
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hospital’s method for applying for financial assistance, and the
actions that the hospital takes in the event of nonpayment.112 IRC
§ 501(r) and the Revenue Regulations do not contain guidelines as to
how hospitals are to determine eligibility for financial assistance.113
This leaves the determinations of the eligibility requirements to the
hospitals’ complete discretion.114 The hospitals generally set the FAP
requirements to cover those individuals who are uninsured or
underinsured and fall at or near the poverty line.115 Although the FAP
may help those who are uninsured, those with insurance generally do
not qualify for this type of assistance and therefore will be subject to
out-of-network bills and the collection practices of private
companies.116
Similar to insurance with out-of-network providers, the hospital
FAP covers bills coming directly from the hospital but does not cover
treatment a patient may receive from a provider who bills separately
from the hospital.117 For those who qualify for the FAP, these

112. I.R.C. § 501(r)(4); Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 695.
113. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 522–23.
114. Id.
115. Financial Assistance (Charity Care), NEWPORT HOSP. & HEALTH SERVS.,
http://newporthospitalandhealth.org/patients-families/patient-financial-services/charitycareuncompensated-services/ [https://perma.cc/9KFF-L884] (last visited Oct. 15, 2017); Financial
Assistance Program Policy, NORTHSIDE HOSP. https://www.northside.com/financial-assistance-policy
[https://perma.cc/C58V-6HVL] (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
116. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 519.
Patients may find themselves unprotected by the fair pricing and collection rules
because they fall into a coverage gap. The patient may receive care at a for-profit
hospital not subject to § 501(r)’s rules, which make up over one-fifth of all hospitals in
the United States and almost half of the hospitals in some states. Or the patient may be
ineligible for financial assistance, either because the hospital adopts a stingy policy or
the patient is part of a group excluded from financial assistance, such as middle class
uninsured or insured patients paying out-of-pocket for care because they are out-ofnetwork, have a high deductible, or are otherwise underinsured.
Id. at 511.
117. Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals; Community Health Needs Assessments for
Charitable Hospitals; Requirement of a Section 4959 Excise Tax Return and Time for Filing the Return,
79 Fed. Reg. 78,954, 78,971 (Dec. 31, 2014) (codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.501(r)–.507(a) (2018)) (“A
number of commenters noted that patients, including emergency room patients, are commonly seen (and
separately billed) by private physician groups or other third-party providers while in the hospital
setting . . . . [C]ommenters noted that patients are often unaware of the financial arrangements between
various providers in the hospital facility and may unknowingly be transferred to a provider that
separately bills the patients for care.”).
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surprise bills are often especially detrimental.118 Similar to the
measures that states are taking to prevent patients from receiving an
out-of-network bill, the regulations have tried to improve
transparency by requiring that a list of physicians who bill separately
for emergency services be listed as not covered by the hospital’s
FAP.119
Under the FAP, IRC § 501(r)(5) requires that the hospital limits
the amount that an individual can be charged for emergency or any
other medically necessary care to the amount generally billed to those
covered by insurance.120 The limitation on billing charges only
applies to those who qualify under the FAP and not to every patient
who walks through the hospital doors.121 Further, the underlying
incentive to increase pricing for those who do not meet the FAP
requirements is still present because these bills can be considered
charity care if they go unpaid and are determined to be
uncollectible.122
3. Billing and Collections
Harsh debt-collection practices plague the health industry and
impact both the insured and the uninsured.123 Patients are not only
118. Id.
119. Id. (“[L]ist the providers, other than the hospital facility itself, delivering emergency or other
medically necessary care in the hospital facility and to specify which providers are covered by the
hospital facility’s FAP (and which are not).”).
120. I.R.C. § 501(r)(5) (2018) (“[A]mounts charged for emergency or other medically necessary care
provided to individuals eligible for assistance under the financial assistance policy described in
paragraph (4)(A) to not more than the amounts generally billed to individuals who have insurance
covering such care, and (B) prohibits the use of gross charges.”), invalidated by Texas v. United States,
340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at
523.
121. I.R.C. § 501(r).
122. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 535–36; McGraph, supra note 79, at 175–76 (“The ability to
maintain their charitable status by overstating their provision of free care is part of the calculus that
allows these hospitals to be classified as not-for-profit; it may also net these hospitals great savings from
property tax burdens.”).
123. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 522 (“Price discrimination and aggressive debt collection have
been routine practices of nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals and for-profit, taxable hospitals alike.”);
McGraph, supra note 79, at 176 (“The practice of claiming uncollectible debt as charity care has come
under heavy scrutiny lately, as for-profit hospitals provide similar benefits to the community using this
standard, leading many to question the value of not-for-profit hospitals’ tax-exempt status.”); Kiel,
supra note 110 (“When it secured a judgment, as it typically did, Northwest was entitled to seize a hefty
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left with large bills but are also subsequently hounded by debt
collectors for payment.124 The unpaid debts generally do not stay at
the hospital but are sold to debt-collection agencies at a discounted
rate.125 Section 501(r)(6) prohibits a tax-exempt hospital from
engaging in extraordinary collection actions or sending the bill to a
debt-collection agency before the organization has made reasonable
efforts to determine whether the individual is eligible for assistance
under the FAP.126 Again, similar to the limits on billing charges, the
collections restriction only applies to those who may qualify for the
hospital’s FAP.127
Because the ACA has helped close the gap in the number of
individuals who do not have insurance, fewer individuals now qualify
portion of a debtor’s paycheck. During those years, the company garnished the pay of about 6,000
people and seized at least $12 million—an average of about $2,000 each . . . .”).
124. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 518–19 (“The problem of unfair hospital prices is exacerbated by
harsh debt[-]collection practices. Hospitals have used aggressive debt[-]collection practices to recover
unpaid bills, inflicting significant financial, emotional, and health-related hardship on patients. In 2003,
Lucette Lagnado wrote about Quinton White, a seventy-eight[-]year[-]old widower who was still paying
his late wife’s $18,740 medical bill to Yale-New Haven Hospital twenty years later, which, with interest
charges, had grown to more than $55,000. The Whites were an uninsured, working[-]class couple
ineligible for Medicaid. The hospital put a lien on White’s home, seizing his bank account, and putting
him on an installment plan to pay nearly $33,000 interest. Around this time, news outlets all over the
country started reporting about hospitals’ use of harsh measures to collect unpaid medical bills,
including assigning the debt to collection agencies, suing patients, putting liens or seeking foreclosure
on patients’ homes, garnishing wages, charging high interest rates, and even seeking arrest or body
attachment for failing to appear in court for a debt[-]collection hearing.”); Kiel, supra note 110.
125. McGraph, supra note 79, at 193 (“When medical bills are not paid, hospitals and doctors often
turn the debt over to a collection agency, which may harm a person’s credit history. This damage to their
credit will further interfere with their ability to pay, as he or she will then likely pay higher interest
rates in the unlikely event they are able to secure financing to pay these debts. About 23% of uninsured
people in 2003 reported they were contacted by a collection agency.”); Kiel, supra note 110. A 2017
Supreme Court opinion changed the landscape of debt-collection laws by holding that a company that
owns a debt and attempts to collect it, instead of attempting to collect on behalf of another entity like a
hospital, falls outside the scope of federal laws that regulate the practices of debt collectors. Matthew D.
Haan, Gorsuch’s Purgatory: Attempting to Define Debt Collector Under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 434 (2019).
126. I.R.C. § 501(r)(6) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 696–97.
Extraordinary collection actions occur when a hospital engages a legal or judicial
process to procure payment of a hospital bill for care that is covered under
the hospital’s financial assistance policy. It is also considered an extraordinary
collection action to sell an individual’s debt to a third party or to report adverse
information about an individual to consumer credit reporting agencies.
Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 696–97.
127. I.R.C. § 501(r)(5) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019).
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for financial assistance, and thus, more individuals are not protected
by capped billing and harsh collection practices.128
B. How the Standards Apply to Outsourced Entities
The tax-exemption requirements set out in IRC §§ 501(c) and
501(r) only apply to hospitals and not to those with whom the
hospital contracts because it is solely the hospital, and not the
contractor, who is exempt from taxation.129 As hospitals continue to
outsource entire departments—especially emergency rooms—
patients are at a greater risk of receiving surprise medical bills from
hospitals whose main purpose is supposed to be charitable work.130
So long as hospitals comply with IRC §§ 501(c) and 501(r), they can
continue to enjoy federal and state tax exemption while private
companies can bill and use collection agencies to collect on those
bills.131
Though the hospital facility itself may satisfy the requirements to
be considered a charitable organization, the staffing agency is a wolf
in sheep’s clothing, using the nonprofit facility to exploit those who
are unknowingly unable to afford treatment.132 The staffing agency,
EmCare, is a prime example.133 A not-for-profit hospital in
Washington state outsourced its emergency room staffing through
EmCare due to increasing costs.134 EmCare, a for-profit staffing
agency, used the strategy of staying out-of-network as a way to
increase revenues. Thus, EmCare did not routinely contract with the
same health plans that the hospitals did and relied on balance billing
and harsh debt-collection practices to collect from patients. EmCare
128. See Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 696–97.
129. Liss, supra note 21 (“‘The physician practice doesn’t have to comply with the tax-exempt
standards . . . .’”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Creswell, Abelson & Sanger-Katz, supra note 34.
133. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 36; Creswell, Abelson & Sanger-Katz, supra note 34; Fuse Brown,
supra note 78, at 511. Although the additional standards imposed by I.R.C. § 501(r) were intended to
protect “many financially vulnerable patients from inflated hospital bills and aggressive debt[]collection tactics,” the nonprofit is, in effect, allowed to skirt these requirements through using staffing
agencies who are not bound by these requirements. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 511.
134. See Creswell, Abelson & Sanger-Katz, supra note 34.
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was not subject to the same requirements as the hospital, and thus, for
every patient that came through the emergency room doors, there
were no charitable care requirements, financial assistance policies,
caps on billing, or protections against harsh debt-collection
practices.135
Because relatively few states have taken steps to protect their
citizens from receiving a surprise medical bill, patients are still
exposed to out-of-network billing.136 Although some of the
legislation focuses on different mechanisms to resolve medical bills
and release patients from the burden of huge bills, most of the
legislation does not address preventing patients from receiving these
bills. The following section proposes how the tax-exempt
requirements of not-for-profit hospitals can be used to protect
patients in states that are currently lacking protection from surprise
medical billing.
III. Tax Exemption as an Incentive for Patient Protection
Approximately 60% of hospitals in the United States qualify as
tax-exempt organizations under IRC § 501.137 Hence, 60% of
135. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 36; Creswell, Abelson & Sanger-Katz, supra note 34. Although
the hospital’s tax-exempt status is not at risk due to EmCare’s business practices, the hospital may not
be considered to be operating an emergency room open to all under these circumstances, which is one of
the factors for satisfying the community benefit standard. See Rev. Ruling 69-545. However, as
discussed above, the presence of an emergency room is merely one of several weighted factors, and it is
still uncertain whether the hospital would be considered to not be operating an emergency room under
these circumstances. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.; discussion infra Section III.B.
136. See Berke, supra note 9, at 173 (“Very few states have extended balance billing protections to
enrollees who obtain care from out-of-network providers . . . . [I]nvoluntary encounters with out-ofnetwork care, such as those that result from emergency medicine and drive-by-doctoring, are different
because consumer choice has been removed.”); see Herman, supra note 19.
A number of states such as California, New York[,] and Texas have approved or are
considering rules that address unexpected out-of-network bills. New York has adopted
the toughest measure. Since April, the state has required insurers and providers that
disagree on out-of-network payment to go through an independent dispute-resolution
process.
....
. . . [Although] the ACA requires health plans to pay out-of-network emergency
providers at network rates, patients in many states still are exposed to balance billing.
Herman, supra note 19.
137. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Stacy Madden, Did You Know: For-Profit Versus Nonprofit
Hospitals, HEALTH NET (Oct. 11, 2013), http://healthnetpulse.com/broker/2013/10/11/did-you-know-
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hospitals in the United States are organized with the purpose of
providing charitable work to the communities that they serve.138 As
expressly stated in numerous hospital mission statements, the
hospitals’ goals are to provide accessible acute and emergency care
to the communities that they serve.139
Nationally, the tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospitals has saved
them approximately $12 billion per year in federal income tax.140
Nonprofit hospitals that outsource their emergency departments using
companies such as EmCare or TeamHealth receive this taxexemption benefit from being qualified as charitable organizations
while placing increased burdens on the patients who come to the
hospitals seeking care.141
To justify the federal tax exemption, nonprofit hospitals should be
obligated to better serve patients in their communities. The Tax Code
is a unique mechanism that Congress can use to incentivize certain
behaviors.142 To effectuate these policy goals, the tax-exemption
requirements for hospitals should be expanded in two ways. First,
Congress and the IRS need to place additional emphasis on the value
of operating an accessible emergency room. Second, the IRS should
revoke the tax exemption of hospitals where the subcontractors
engage in surprise billing and extraordinary collections against their

for-profit-versus-nonprofit-hospitals/ [https://perma.cc/BF9G-4ZCL].
138. Madden, supra note 137.
139. Health Reform, supra note 107.
140. Tahk, supra note 64, at 35. In addition to the annual $12 billion in tax savings, the tax exemption
also “allows hospitals to raise $5.3 billion in tax-deductible contributions annually. As a result, the
exemption plays a key role in providing health care in the U.S.” Id. (footnote omitted).
141. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 36; McGrath, supra note 79, at 175–76 (“Most hospitals, however,
do not pay income tax because they qualify as charitable, not-for-profit entities. While these not-forprofit hospitals may not benefit from tax deductions, they still benefit by charging the uninsured inflated
list prices.”).
142. Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S.
Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS 67, 67–68 (2013).
Congress has been relying increasingly on the [T]ax [C]ode to accomplish goals
beyond raising revenue. Taxpayers have quietly become accustomed to finding social
and regulatory programs buried in the [T]ax [C]ode. Perhaps as a result, no one has
seemed to notice as Congress and presidential administrations have, more and more
frequently, employed the [T]ax [C]ode to accomplish goals that have nothing to do
with raising revenue.
Id. at 67.
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patients to ensure that the societal benefits behind the tax exemption
are realized.
A. Tax as a Policy Incentive
The Tax Code is used for much more than simply raising
revenue.143 Congress uses its taxing power to accomplish policy
goals and regulatory and social-benefit programs.144 Under the
Patient Protection and Affordability Care Act, Congress used its
taxing power in the healthcare sector.145 One of the provisions in
which Congress previously used its taxing power to effectuate the
goals of the ACA was the individual mandate that imposed a tax
penalty on those who are not covered by health insurance.146
Similarly, IRC § 501(r) imposes additional restrictions on
nonprofit hospitals as discussed above.147 These requirements
incentivize charitable hospitals to have a community focus by
providing them a tax benefit for complying with the set standards.148
143. Id. (“[T]he [T]ax [C]ode has recently come to incorporate ‘policies aimed at the environment,
conservation, green energy, manufacturing, innovation, education, saving, retirement, health care, child
care, welfare, corporate governance, export promotion, charitable giving, governance of tax exempt
organizations, and economic development . . . .’”) (quoting Pamela F. Olson, Laurence Neal Woodworth
Memorial Lecture: And Then Cnut Told Reagan . . . Lessons from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (May, 6,
2010)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 68 (“Most observers know the Affordable Care Act as a major piece of social and
regulatory legislation. However, they have failed to focus on the fact that the bill was in large part a tax
bill. Many of the bill’s major elements took the form of [T]ax [C]ode provisions.”).
146. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Tahk, supra note 142,
at 67–68, 71. Although the individual mandate has since been repealed, it serves as an example as to
how the Tax Code can be used to advance policy in the healthcare sector. See Christina Lima, Trump
Boasts of Individual Mandate Repeal in GOP Tax Bill, POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/20/trump-individual-mandate-repeal-tax-bill-308286
[https://perma.cc/48C3-9RBV].
147. See discussion supra Part II.
148. Eric J. Santos, Property Tax Exemptions for Hospitals: A Blunt Instrument Where a Scalpel Is
Needed, 8 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 113, 129 (2017).
Hospitals are huge, complicated businesses, and addressing the issues they face is
made more difficult by the fact that they provide services that are essential. Quality
healthcare is important for both the individuals who receive it and all others who
benefit from living in a generally healthy place. However, the current system grew out
of a world where hospitals were simpler and less integral to our society.
The fundamental problem is that tax exemption is all or nothing; a hospital either
keeps exemption or loses it. Losing exemption from state property taxes would be
massively costly for any hospital. Modern hospitals necessarily own and occupy a
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However, nonprofit hospitals have no incentive to go beyond these
set requirements because they are still in some capacity a profitdriven enterprise.149 Recently, nonprofit hospitals have been
financially strained.150 Nonprofit hospitals cannot sustain themselves
merely on charitable donations alone.151 They must be profitable to
generate sufficient funds to maintain the hospital while ensuring that
they are not incurring losses.152 The function of the hospital as a
profit-seeking enterprise incentivizes them to comply with tax
exemption requirements. Otherwise, the federal tax expense that the
hospital would be subject to would impose a greater financial burden
than the cost of operating an emergency room without a staffing
agency. Thus, the Tax Code can be used as a mechanism to protect
patients from surprise medical bills while still effectuating the goals
and missions of nonprofit hospitals and the policy reasons behind
providing tax exemptions.153
The tax-exempt provisions for charitable hospitals in the Tax Code
have the power to alleviate the impact of surprise medical bills in
United States hospitals.154 This unique position rests on the $12
million incentive that the tax provision provides hospitals that have to
balance costs in the healthcare market.155 The Tax Code could be
used to decrease the number of surprise medical bills that Americans
receive in a number of ways: first, by redefining the charitable
deduction standards that a hospital must meet by further clarifying
“community benefit” to emphasize the importance of the emergency
room factor; second, by incorporating calculations of the burdens of
patients’ medical debts from hospital services in the CHNA or
Schedule H, which hospitals must complete in the annual Form 990
huge amount of property . . . . Being forced to bear such a cost with little warning
could predictably force a hospital to cancel unprofitable services and become forprofit, or close its doors entirely.
Id.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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See Santos, supra note 148, at 133.
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See id. at 129; Tahk, supra note 64, at 35; Young, supra note 64, at 329.
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informational return to the IRS; lastly, by revoking the tax exemption
of any hospital whose contracted emergency room physicians engage
in routine surprise billing, this would incentivize hospitals to contract
with staffing agencies that do not engage in these practices.
B. The Importance of Emergency Rooms
The emergency room is the community medical center where those
with health care needs most commonly enter the hospital.156 From the
emergency room, patients are transferred or referred to other
departments of the hospital to receive further treatment.157 Due to its
function, the emergency room is one of the most important
departments of the hospital and must be available to patients at all
hours of the day.
The current revenue rulings are not clear as to whether operating
an accessible and affordable emergency room is necessary to retain
tax-exempt status. Revenue Ruling 69-545 sets forth a balancing test
using the community-benefit approach that considers the overall
benefit that the hospital provides to the community.158 The presence
of an emergency room that is open to all is one of several factors
considered in this analysis.159 Subsequently, Revenue Ruling 83-157
states that an emergency room is not necessary in all circumstances
to retain tax exemption.160 Revenue Ruling 83-157 provides
examples of situations where an emergency room is not needed,
including specialized hospitals or communities where an alternative,
functional emergency room is already present.161 This Revenue
Ruling emphasizes a totality-of-the-circumstances approach when
determining whether an emergency room is necessary for tax
exemption.162
156. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 483–84 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2015); Cooper,
supra note 23, at 3.
157. AHS Hosp. Corp., 28 N.J. Tax at 484.
158. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
159. Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Health Care
Delivery Structures; a Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (1995).
160. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
161. Id.
162. 1 TAXATION OF HOSPITALS & HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS § 4.03 (2017).
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The regulations specifically look to whether the emergency room
is open to all patients regardless of their ability to pay.163 As the
number of patients who are covered by insurance has increased as a
result of the ACA, the amount of charity care has decreased because
hospitals’ focus has shifted from the level of charity care to the
overall benefit that the hospital provides the public.164 However, the
mere presence of an emergency room does not benefit the community
if the patients using the emergency room are leaving with inflated
medical bills or are subjected to harsh collection practices.
When determining whether an emergency room is functional and
open to the public, the standard should focus on the output of the
hospital, meaning the percentage of the patients who visit the
emergency room receiving affordable care. Currently, the focus is on
the patients’ financial and insured status when they enter the
hospital—whether they are covered by insurance, are indigent, or
qualify for the FAP.165
Further, the value of medical debts that patients are left with after
receiving treatment from the nonprofit hospital’s emergency room
must be considered in the calculation of the overall community
benefit provided by the nonprofit hospital. For example, in St. Louis,
Missouri, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of
lawsuits involving medical debt resulting from treatment at nonprofit
hospitals’ emergency rooms.166 The value of medical debt pursued
against patients through extraordinary collection actions indicates
that the hospital is not operated primarily for charitable purposes by
promoting health for the benefit of the community. Thus, this

163. Helvin, supra note 82, at 440–41 (“[T]he IRS set forth four ‘general requirements’ that a health
care organization was obligated to meet in order to be deemed ‘charitable’ for federal tax exemption
purposes . . . . [T]he most notable of these requirements was that a hospital must serve those who are
unable to pay for health services[] and not exclusively care for patients who can afford the costs.”).
164. See Santos, supra note 148, at 132–33.
165. Fuse Brown, supra note 78, at 519.
166. Liss, supra note 21 (“CP Medical has filed at least 1,078 lawsuits in St. Louis . . . between Dec.
2, 2014, and March 10, 2016. After reviewing all the lawsuits, the newspaper found that 99[%] of the
cases involved debt that originated from ER treatment at an SSM hospital.”). The Morristown hospital
case involved the revocation of state-tax-exempt status, not federal. See generally AHS Hosp. Corp. v.
Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2015).
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information must be included in the mandated CHNA along with a
proposal of the hospital’s solution to fix it.
The unavailability of an affordable emergency room to those who
are covered by insurance should be sufficient for the IRS and states
to challenge the tax-exempt status of hospitals for failure to adhere to
the community benefit standard.167 However, further issues occur as
more hospitals are not running their own emergency rooms but are
outsourcing the department to other companies.168
C. Contracting Agencies
Although the emergency room is arguably one of the most
important departments in the hospital facility, it is also one of the
most unprofitable departments.169 Additional costs are required to
keep the emergency room staffed and operating at all hours of the
day.170 Further, compared to other departments, many of those
seeking treatment in the emergency room are poor or uninsured.171
Currently, there are incentives for emergency room physicians to
remain out-of-network. The ACA requires that insurers pay for outof-network emergency room care, so physicians will be paid and will
be paid more if they remain out-of-network than if they contract with
payers. A Texas study showed that out of several insurance
companies’ in-network hospitals, up to 56% of the emergency rooms
in those hospitals had zero in-network physicians.172 As a result, the
physicians’ bills received from treatment in those emergency rooms
are not covered by the insurance company.
167. AHS Hosp. Corp., 28 N.J. Tax at 465, 483 (holding a nonprofit hospital did not meet the
statutory standards for tax exemption because it bore “little, if any, resemblance” to their “early origins
as charitable alms houses providing free basic medical treatment to the infirm poor[,]” because “they are
[now] sophisticated centers of medical care . . . providing a litany of medical services regardless of a
patient’s ability to pay”); Beth Jones Sanborn, IRS Revokes Tax-Exempt Status for County-Run Hospital,
Raising Specter of More Actions Against Nonprofits, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Aug. 16, 2017),
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/irs-revokes-tax-exempt-status-county-run-hospitalraising-specter-more-actions-against [https://perma.cc/HY2D-9ME5] (revoking tax-exempt status of a
nonprofit hospital for failure to perform a community health needs assessment).
168. Cooper, supra note 23, at 36.
169. Swogier, supra note 106, at 466.
170. Cooper, supra note 23, at 3.
171. Swogier, supra note 106, at 466.
172. Berke, supra note 9, at 174.
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Currently, physicians are not required to participate in the same
networks as the hospital to receive privileges to work in the
hospital.173 Even though they operate “under the same roof,” the
hospital must comply with the tax-exempt-status requirements while
the third-party contractors do not.174 Thus, the level of out-ofnetwork care and consequential surprise medical billing is due to
contracting failure between the hospital and the third-party
contractors.
If, as a condition of retaining tax exemption, tax-exemption
requirements had to be considered during these contract negotiations,
the hospital would be incentivized not only to choose the cheapest
contractor but also to consider the effect that each contract would
have on the community it serves.175 This incentive would hopefully
result in fewer out-of-network bills because, by considering the effect
on the community, the hospital would negotiate with physicians and
third parties who contract with the same insurer as the facility.176
Without this requirement, hospitals will continue to act in the profitmaximizing manner of using the cheapest option to staff and
maintain their emergency rooms, regardless of the financial effect
that it has on patients.
Further, third-party staffing companies such as EmCare and
TeamHealth will be incentivized to adhere to the Tax Code as a way
to market their services toward nonprofit hospitals. By adhering to
the same tax exemption requirements as the hospital, these staffing
companies become more attractive to nonprofit hospitals when
staffing difficult-to-maintain departments because they could contract
with the staffing company to save both on department costs as well as
retain their tax-exempt status. Because over half of the hospitals in
173. Id.
174. Liss, supra note 21 (“[T]he two entities are held to different standards when it comes to helping
patients financially. The hospital itself is under a charitable obligation, but not the
contractor . . . . ’[T]hat’s the problem in this case, there is a middleman that is allowing them to skirt that
requirement . . . .’”).
175. Herman, supra note 19 (“[H]ospitals could require physicians, as a condition of practicing at
their facilities, to join the same health plan networks in which they participate . . . .”).
176. Id. (“At Boca Raton Regional . . . contracting anesthesiologists, emergency physicians,
pathologists[,] and radiologists ‘know they have to contract with the plans that [the hospital] contract[s]
with.’ The hospital has handled fewer complaints as a result.”).
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the United States are classified as nonprofit, the staffing companies
would be strongly incentivized to negotiate with insurance companies
and comply with the tax-exemption standards.
CONCLUSION
Surprise medical billing is an ever-growing issue in the United
States as networks continue to shrink and more Americans leave the
hospital with out-of-network bills.177 The complexities of the
healthcare system and varying standards set across states make this
an even more difficult issue to resolve.178 Currently, only a handful
of states have taken steps to protect their citizens from receiving a
crushing medical bill.179
The federal government, whose goal is to increase public health
and the financial security of the population, has allowed for a tax
exemption for hospitals that comply with specified standards.180
These standards focus on the community benefit that the hospital
provides and look to a certain level of charity care and financial
assistance provided by the hospital.181
Currently, nonprofit hospitals are facing cost constraints,
incentivizing hospitals to staff emergency rooms with out-of-network
providers. This cost-saving action burdens patients with the cost of
emergency services and has effectively made healthcare less
accessible.
177. Id. (“[A] published [] survey in June 2013 . . . showed roughly 40% of people who went to outof-network physicians did so involuntarily. A March 2015 study from Consumers Union found that
surprise medical bills hit 30% of privately insured Americans, and a quarter of those patients said the
bill came from a doctor they did not expect.”).
178. See discussion infra Part I.
179. Fuse Brown, supra note 9, at 147–49 (“A number of states have begun to pass legislation
targeting surprise bills and balance[]billing directly . . . . More recently, states have begun passing
legislation to more specifically address the phenomenon of surprise medical bills . . . . Thus far, New
York, Connecticut, California, Florida, and Texas have passed law[s] curtailing surprise medical
billing.”).
180. I.R.C. § 501(c), (r) (2018), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D.
Tex. 2018) (appeal filed 5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 69-545,
1969-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202; Polaris, supra note 18, at 132; Santos, supra note
148, at 118–19.
181. I.R.C. § 501(c), (r); Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Rev.
Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202; McGrath, supra note 79, at 175–76; Weisblatt, supra note 80, at 694.
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As the healthcare market continues to evolve, tax law must also
evolve to ensure that the policy goals of the community, government,
and hospital are being effectuated.182 By using the Tax Code as a
mechanism to induce nonprofit hospitals to maintain an accessible
and affordable emergency room and simultaneously incentivizing
those who contract with the hospital to comply with tax-exempt
standards, Congress can require hospitals to continue providing
public benefits while protecting patients from medical debt.

182. See Santos, supra note 148, at 133.
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